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The existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series 
(NSS) publications do not provide specific guidance for the different types of 
nuclear facilities; these are typically meant as a general guidance for nuclear facilities 
rather than having specific application to any specific facility type. Accordingly, the 
question may rise whether operators of different nuclear facilities would need to take 
account of the specific characteristics of their facilities during the implementation 
of the recommendations and guidance provided in IAEA NSS publications. The 
comprehensive answer to the question (regarding each type of nuclear facility) requires 
the identification of the above mentioned specific characteristics of all nuclear facility 
types and the systematic assessment of the exiting IAEA NSS publications, including 
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and other implementing and technical guides. 
The identification of specific characteristics of different nuclear facilities that may 
influence the design and implementation of their physical protection systems and 
measures is the starting point of this comprehensive review process.
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A Nemzetközi Atomenergia Ügynökség Nukleáris Védettségi Sorozatban eddig 
megjelent útmutatók nem adnak specifikus útmutatást a különböző típusú nukle-
áris létesítményekre vonatkozóan. A meghatározott követelmények és ajánlások 
általános érvényűek az összes nukleáris létesítményre. Felmerül a kérdés, hogy 
a különböző típusú nukleáris létesítmények üzemeltetőinek figyelembe kell-e venni 
a saját létesítmények specifikus tulajdonságait a NAÜ-követelmények és -ajánlások 
alkalmazásakor. A kérdés átfogó megválaszolásához meg kell határozni a különböző 
típusú nukleáris létesítmények nukleáris védettségi szempontból releváns tulaj-
donságait és értékelni kell, hogy ezek befolyásolják-e a követelmények és ajánlá-
sok alkalmazhatóságát. A különböző nukleáris létesítményeknek a fizikai védelmi 
rendszer tervezése és megvalósítása szempontjából releváns tulajdonságainak 
meghatározása és vizsgálata az első lépése ennek az átfogó feladatnak.
Kulcsszavak: nukleáris védettség, nukleáris létesítmények védettségi szempontból 
releváns tulajdonságai, NAÜ, fizikai védelem
IAEA Nuclear Security Series
Nuclear security issues relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, 
theft, sabotage, unauthorised access and illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving 
nuclear material and other radioactive substances and their associated facilities are 
addressed in the publications of IAEA Nuclear Security Series. These publications are 
consistent with, and complement, international nuclear security instruments, such 
as the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [1], the 
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, and the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series are issued in the following 
categories:
• Nuclear Security Fundamentals contain objectives, concepts and principles of 
nuclear security and provide the basis for security recommendations.
• Recommendations present best practices that should be adopted by Member 
States in the application of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals.
• Implementing Guides provide further elaboration of the Recommendations 
in broad areas and suggest measures for their implementation.
• Technical Guidance publications include: Reference Manuals, with detailed 
measures and/or guidance on how to apply the Implementing Guides in specific 
fields or activities; Training Guides, covering the syllabus and/or manuals 
for IAEA training courses in the area of nuclear security; and Service Guides, 
which provide guidance on the conduct and scope of IAEA nuclear security 
advisory missions [2].
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Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material and Nuclear Facilities
In the hierarchy of the Nuclear Security Series, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 [3] 
together with IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14 [4] comprehensively cover the area 
of nuclear security of nuclear material and other radioactive material, associated 
facilities and associated activities, including the use, storage and transport of such 
material. As a recommendation level document, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 
13 contains recommendations and recommended requirements which apply to the 
physical protection of nuclear material against unauthorised removal with the intent 
to construct a nuclear explosive device, and to the physical protection of nuclear 
facilities and nuclear material against sabotage. Protection requirements against 
unauthorised removal of nuclear material (as radioactive material) for potential 
subsequent off-site dispersal are provided in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14.
By definition contained in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, nuclear material 
is that material which is listed and categorised in its Table 1 (i.e. unirradiated and 
irradiated plutonium and uranium). A nuclear facility is defined as a facility (including 
associated buildings and equipment) in which nuclear material is produced, processed, 
used, handled, stored or disposed of and for which a specific licence is required.
The recommended requirements for the physical protection against unauthorised 
removal in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 follow a graded approach, applying 
a categorisation system which is based on the attractiveness of the nuclear material 
for the construction of a nuclear explosive device. The recommended requirements on 
physical protection against sabotage apply to nuclear material and nuclear facilities. 
They are based on the inventory, not considering the characteristics of different 
types of nuclear facilities. The basis for the graded approach of protection against 
sabotage is not the category of the nuclear material, but the concern on potential 
radiological consequences resulting from the radioactive inventory present in the 
facility as a result of a successful sabotage. The recommended requirements apply 
to all nuclear facilities, including nuclear reactors (nuclear power plants and research 
reactors) and nuclear fuel cycle facilities (including conversion, enrichment, fabrication, 
reprocessing, and storage facilities). There is one set of requirements for material in 
use and storage, which implies that this material is located in a facility and another 
set of requirements is defined for nuclear material during transport.
Existing IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications do not provide specific guidance 
for different types of nuclear facilities; these are typically meant as a general guidance 
for nuclear facilities rather than having specific application to any specific facility 
type. While in the area of nuclear safety, the safety standards series provide safety 
fundamentals, safety requirements, and facility type specific requirements and guidance 
for all relevant types of nuclear facilities.
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Different Types of Nuclear Facilities
Conversion and enrichment facilities
In conversion and enrichment facilities, most of the uranium is in the chemical form 
UF6. The physical form of UF6 could be either gaseous, liquid or solid. Depending on 
the enrichment of the final product, the nuclear material would be of Category III 
(uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% U235 or Category II (Uranium 
enriched to 10% U235 but less than 20%) nuclear material.
A significant potential hazard associated with these facilities is a loss of the means 
of confinement resulting in a release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and hazardous 
chemicals such as hydrofluoric acid and fluorine. In addition, for enrichment facilities 
and conversion facilities that process uranium, criticality can also be a significant 
hazard. The radiotoxicity of the uranium is low, and any potential off-site radiological 
consequence following a sabotage would be expected to be limited; however, the 
radiological consequences of an accidental release of reprocessed uranium would be 
likely to be greater.
The enrichment process relies to a large extent on operator intervention and 
administrative controls to ensure safety, in addition to active and passive engineered 
safety measures. Since for enrichment of nuclear material to the required level, the 
nuclear material will be imported from conversion facilities, moved on-site, heated 
and processed, filled into containers, stored and exported to customers, e.g. fuel 
fabrication facilities, the administrative control must manage all these activities in 
a way that safety and security is well coordinated and robust against insider threat 
activities. In addition to protection against unauthorised removal and sabotage, 
protection of enrichment technology plays an important role.
Fuel fabrication facilities
In uranium fuel fabrication facilities, large amounts of radioactive material are present 
in a dispersible form. This is particularly so in the early stages of the fuel fabrication 
process. In addition, the radioactive material encountered exists in diverse chemical 
and physical forms and is used in conjunction with flammable or chemically reactive 
substances as part of the process. Depending on the requested fuel enrichment 
degree, these facilities used and stored Category III and Category II nuclear material.
The main hazards in these facilities are the potential criticality and the release of 
UF6 and uranium dioxide (UO2), from which workers, the public and the environment 
must be protected by means of adequate design and construction and by safe operation.
The fuel fabrication processes rely to a large extent on operator intervention and 
administrative controls to ensure safety, in addition to active and passive engineered 
safety measures. The potential for a release of energy in the event of an accident at 
a uranium fuel fabrication facility is associated with nuclear criticality or chemical 
reactions. The potential for release of energy is small in comparison with that of 
a nuclear power plant, with generally limited environmental consequences.
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Nuclear power plants
Several decades have passed since the appearance of the first nuclear power plants. 
The different types and generations of these energy producing facilities can be well 
characterised from a safety point of view [5], but these aspects are not always relevant 
from the perspective of nuclear security.
The nuclear fuel in most commercial nuclear power plants is made of low enriched 
uranium and belongs to Category III when fresh. Some plants operate with fresh 
mixed uranium-plutonium fuel belonging to Category I because of its unirradiated 
plutonium content. During burnup, the fuel becomes irradiated and as spent fuel, it 
belongs to Category II. During operation, the fission process produces a significant 
inventory of radioactive substances of very high activity. Physical protection against 
sabotage dominates the concern on unauthorised removal in most NPPs. The physical 
protection of nuclear material would be an integral part of the PPS at NPPs.
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 associates the nuclear power plants as facilities 
having high radiological consequence regarding sabotage and formulates requirements 
similar to a facility where Category I nuclear material is in use or storage. Similarly, 
general safety requirements assign facilities, such as nuclear power plants, for which 
on-site events (including those not considered in the design) are postulated that could 
give rise to severe deterministic effects off the site that would warrant precautionary 
urgent protective actions to the highest emergency preparedness category.
Fulfilment of the following fundamental safety functions for a nuclear power 
plant shall be ensured for all plant states. These safety functions are the control of 
reactivity; removal of heat from the reactor and from the fuel store; and confinement 
of radioactive material, shielding against radiation and control of planned radioactive 
releases, as well as limitation of accidental radioactive releases. In order to prevent 
an attempt of sabotage from becoming successful, these functions must also be 
maintained during and after malicious acts performed by insider or external threats.
Main overhauls for maintenance and refuelling, or major repairs require extensive 
human interactions, a huge number of contractors’ staff needs to be authorised for 
access to conduct technical inspections, maintenance, or repair. In addition, different 
equipment and material needs to be cleared when entering the facility.
Moreover, when the reactor pressure vessel is open, the vulnerability to malicious 
acts rises. Security measures should be adjusted to the situation in order to maintain 
security on an appropriate level and to enable the work.
Small modular reactors
A variety of types of large reactors that have been developed in the past are considered 
small modular reactors. Such facilities represent not a newly defined reactor technology, 
but are differentiated by the power level and the modular concept from nuclear 
power plants. The electricity production of a typical small modular reactor is less 
than 300 MW, which requires a smaller fuel inventory, and a lower frequency of fuel 
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loading and unloading. In addition, the amount of radioactive waste stored on the 
site will be less than in existing nuclear power plants.
Some small modular reactors use fuel enriched at the top end of what is defined as 
low-enriched uranium (i.e. a bit below 20% enrichment), other designs use fuel made 
of uranium enriched around 5%. Accordingly, their inventories belong to Category II.
Depending on the type of facility, such as floating, underground, capsuled 
unmanned and remote controlled, the specific facility has features representing 
robustness against unauthorised removal as security is part of its specific design.
In harmony with the smaller inventory and power level, a successful act of 
sabotage may result in less severe radiological consequences.
Research reactors
Research reactor fuel today typically is enriched to less than 20% and belongs to 
Category II. The fuel assemblies are typically plates or cylinders of uranium-aluminium 
alloy clad with pure aluminium. In an open pool reactor, the fuel is in principle 
accessible under water. The sizes and weights of research reactor fuel bundles are 
much smaller than of those used in nuclear power plants; therefore, they are relatively 
easily portable, if radiation is not considered.
Some research reactors are used to produce isotopes which would represent an 
additional inventory of other radioactive material.
The potential for radiological consequences of a sabotage at a research reactor 
depends on its power, design, inventory, lay-out and location.
Spent fuel storage
The inventory of a spent fuel storage facility is composed of spent fuel generated 
by operating nuclear reactors. After a typically 1–5 year storage period in the spent 
fuel pool next to the reactor, the spent fuel is stored prior to reprocessing or disposal 
in a wet or dry spent fuel storage facility. A spent fuel storage facility is by definition not 
a disposal facility, thus its operating lifetime is limited but could last several decades.
Applying the categorisation table, spent fuel is assigned to Category II. The 
required retrievability would enable removal of the fuel assemblies including their 
unauthorised removal.
The potential radiological consequences of a spent fuel storage facility are 
typically a magnitude lower than those of a nuclear power plant. The driving force 
represented by the high thermal and nuclear power of a nuclear power reactor is 
missing so that indirect sabotage is less attractive. The success of a sabotage depends 
on the robustness of casks and building structures.
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Reprocessing facilities
Large quantities of fissile material, radioactive material, radiotoxic and other hazardous 
materials are present (stored, processed and generated) in a fuel reprocessing facility, 
often in easily dispersible forms (e.g. solutions, powders and gases) and sometimes 
subjected to vigorous chemical and physical reactions.
Separation and purification processes will lead to significant amounts of uranium 
and plutonium belonging to Category I.
The fuel reprocessing processes are a mixture of high and low hazard, chemical and 
mechanical processes, including high hazard fine particulate processes and processing 
involving hazardous solid, liquid, gaseous and particulate (dry, air and water-borne) 
wastes and effluents. Reprocessing facilities have the potential for serious nuclear 
and radiological emergencies. The main risks of a sabotage are criticality, loss of 
confinement, radiation exposure and associated chemical hazards.
Disposal facilities
The nuclear material in a disposal facility is generally processed to produce stable 
and solid forms, and reduced in volume and immobilised, as far as practicable, to 
facilitate their transport and disposal.
The content of nuclear material would belong to Category II. The term “disposal” 
implies that retrieval is not intended, but it does not mean that retrieval is not possible. 
Unauthorised removal of radioactive waste, also for off-site dispersal needs to be 
considered when securing the facility.
The inventory of radioactive waste represents a potential hazard to the biosphere.
Attributes and Characteristics of Security Relevance
As recommended in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13: “Three types of risk should be 
taken into consideration for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities [3]:
• Risk of unauthorized removal with the intent to construct a nuclear explosive 
device;
• Risk of unauthorized removal which could lead to subsequent dispersal;
• Risk of sabotage.”
Different types of nuclear facilities represent different levels of these risks. The risk is 
a function of severity of consequences of an event and the probability that the event 
would occur. The categorisation table in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and the 
thresholds for radiological consequences are related to the severity. The probability 
of an event leading to these consequences would be strongly determined by the type 
and design of a facility.
IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 requires the consideration of specific facility 
characteristics when implementing physical protection.
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The different types of nuclear facilities, including research reactors [6] with 
regard to the implementation of nuclear security measures, can be characterised 
according to the following attributes and their characteristics.
Security vulnerabilities inherent in design and operational practice
The older facilities were not designed with security as a priority, which can complicate 
the task of providing physical protection. The designs of these facilities were typically 
optimised around their specific objectives. The focus on these objectives often led 
to the inclusion of features that are not conducive to nuclear security and could be 
exploited by an adversary intent on committing unauthorised removal or sabotage, 
such as easy access to nuclear material, frequent reconfiguration of the core, glass 
walled control rooms, access to computer systems through open network, open fuel 
storage, accessible tools and equipment like cranes, forklifts, casks.
Specific safety design
The safety design including provisions against natural or human made external events 
generate robustness against malicious acts. More robust safety systems require 
more complicated attack scenario to be developed for a successful malicious act. 
Safety requirements to be met and the robustness of the required safety features, 
including the required level of redundancy and diversity depend on the radiological 
hazard meant by the facility that correlates with the type of the facility. As safety 
standards are developed continuously and lessons learned during the years are taken 
into account, a new facility is built according to more stringent safety requirements.
Attractiveness of material
The categorisation system of nuclear material basically takes into account the 
applicability of the material to build a nuclear device, but higher enrichment level 
and lower fuel burnup make the nuclear material more attractive as a target of 
unauthorised removal. In addition, lower dose rates from spent or irradiated material 
may be less likely to be incapacitating to an adversary.
Colocation with other facilities
A nuclear facility can be a part of a larger organisation operating other nuclear related 
and also non-related facilities and activities. These other facilities and activities may 
mean security concerns for the nuclear facility. Such security concerns can be raised 
by armed security forces employed in another facility, the adverse consequences 
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of an accident or a security event occurring at the other facility that may result in 
difficulties of the implementation of the nuclear security measures.
Openness of access, exchange of information
Some facilities or certain areas of some facilities are easily accessible to contractors, 
staff, guests, students and other visitors. A large number of temporary personnel 
with unescorted access may require special considerations during the design and 
implementation of the nuclear security system and measures. In addition, the 
environment of information sharing and data transparency may create vulnerability 
for the security of computer based systems.
Variety of uses
Some facility types are designed to fulfil different specific purposes, such as training, 
research, irradiation, experiments, radioisotope production, medical therapy or 
neutron activation. Such diversity complicates the standard approach of meeting 
security requirements.
Funding
The extent and predictability of funding, including that for security can be adversely 
influenced by the budget basis and provision of the facility, especially for those 
which do not have income from the operation. Funding limitations may influence 
the maintenance of security system elements.
Regulatory and operator issues
An operating organisation(s) may lack an appropriate nuclear security culture, at 
times believing that the purpose or mission is more important than compliance 
with regulatory nuclear security requirements [7]. This can be exacerbated by a lack 
of nuclear security expertise and/or organisational independence in the regulatory 
body in States where operation/promotion and regulatory oversight responsibilities 
are within the same government organisation. Such conditions may result in the lack 
of effective regulatory oversight. This, combined with the lack of a nuclear security, 
can significantly complicate effective implementation of security measures.
The staff responsible for security often lack specialised experience and knowledge 
of the security system or of security measures. This can be exacerbated by a lack 
of security expertise in senior management within the organisation and/or at the 
regulatory authority, which limits the ability to perform effective checks and balances. 
Lack of expertise can result in the following:
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• The responsibility for overseeing and implementing security is effectively ignored.
• The security responsibility is undertaken, but the resulting security is ineffective 
due to the limited depth of knowledge and experience in security.
• The security responsibility is transferred to a commercial contractor, whose 
primary motivation is profit rather than effective security.
Site location
Certain geographic locations might be undesirable from nuclear security perspective, 
such as close proximity to densely populated areas, dense traffic in the surrounding 
area, harsh weather conditions, seismic activity, site topography, remote location. 
Depending on the location, such facilities may provide increased robustness against 
sabotage, i.e. off-site or airborne attacks, when located underground or underwater. 
The latter will change the paths for radiological releases. At the same time, sea 
contamination and vulnerability to marine/sub-marine threats or underground threats 
may need to be considered in the nuclear security design.
Facility ageing
The effectiveness of those security and safety features that were present originally 
may have degraded with age. The maintenance of older security system elements 
may require special parts, non-standardised methods and expertise. Protection against 
emerging threats may be difficult with the ageing security system.
Number of employees
The implementation of security measures, especially those related to trustworthiness 
verification, access and regress control, including package checks, recording and 
verification of access rights, operation of turnstiles, verification of identities become 
more complex with the growing number of employees.
Public acceptance, rejection
The public awareness regarding local security threats would be higher, if the public 
accept and support the operation of the facility.
Potential radiological consequences
Depending on the radioactive material inventory of the facility, the radiological 
consequences of a successful sabotage may be different with magnitude.
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Complexity of the site
The development of attack scenarios based on the current threat statement should 
consider the complexity of the site. A more complex site allows more complex attack 
scenarios and require more complex security system, including a larger number of 
response personnel.
Specific nuclear material accounting and control requirements
Protracted theft is easier in bulk facilities. More stringent accounting and control 
requirements, including more frequent inventory taking and verification support the 
effectiveness of the detection of unauthorised removal.
Conclusion
The existing IAEA NSS publications do not provide specific guidance for different types 
of nuclear facilities; Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (IAEA NSS No. 13) and implementing guides 
address technical areas such as nuclear security culture, measures against insider 
threat, design basis threat and computer security; but these are typically meant as 
a general guidance for nuclear facilities rather than having specific application to 
any specific facility type (i.e. enrichment facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear 
power plants, research reactors, small modular reactors, storage facilities and disposal 
facilities). Accordingly, the question whether operators of different nuclear facilities 
would need to take account of the specific characteristics of their facilities when 
implementing recommendations and guidance provided in IAEA NSS publications 
and thus additional guidance or technical documentation would be beneficial for 
them to be developed, or the recommendations and guidance are applicable to each 
type of nuclear facility.
The comprehensive answer to the question (regarding each nuclear facility 
type) requires the identification of the above mentioned specific characteristics of 
all nuclear facility types, and the systematic assessment whether exiting IAEA NSS 
publications, including IAEA NSS No. 13 and other implementing and technical guides 
can be unambiguously implemented or require further guidance.
The identification of specific characteristics of different nuclear facilities that 
may affect their physical protection systems and measures was the starting point of 
this comprehensive review process.
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